A clinician's account of patients with active tuberculosis arriving in Anchorage operating rooms between 2010 and 2016 without the team being told opens the episode. It explains why an operating room is a particular place for an airborne disease, drawing on 2005 federal guidance and outbreaks from unsuspected cases elsewhere. It asks why disclosure fails without blaming patients, and sets Alaska's written policy beside what the clinician says he saw.
Who's who
Paul A. JensenLead author of the CDC's 2005 TB transmission guidelines for health-care settings
Ketchikan, AlaskaHome of Ketchikan General, where the clinician's Alaska work began
Timeline
1982Catanzaro reports ten of thirteen susceptible staff at a bronchoscopy converted their skin tests
1990Hutton reports nine secondary cases and fifty-nine skin-test conversions from one patient
December 30, 2005CDC publishes guidelines for preventing TB transmission in health-care settings
2010 to 2016Period of the incidents in Anchorage by the clinician's account
March 2021Alaska's revised manual calls observed therapy the standard of care for all TB patients
2024Alaska reports 91 cases, a rate of 12.3 per 100,000, the nation's highest
Still debated
Whether observed therapy was in use in Anchorage from 2010 to 2016 is unresolved: written state policy says yes, while the clinician says it was not. Who should have told the operating room team is open, and the reasons his patients did not disclose are unknown.